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Equalising constituency sizes is likely to reduce the electoral
bias in favour of Labour but only minimally so. Much of the
bias is likely to remain because it is due to other factors such
as turnout and vote distribution.
Dec 2 2011
One reason why the government wants to equalise electoral constituency sizes is to correct
for a perceived electoral bias in favour of Labour and against the Conservatives. Claus
Beisbart and Luc Bovens investigate to what extent unequal constituency sizes were
responsible for the electoral bias in the 2010 election.
What is the pro-Labour electoral bias that the Conservatives complain about? Take the
2010 election. The Conservatives received 7.1% more votes and secured 306 seats—which
is 7.4% more seats—than Labour UK-wide. Now let us do a thought experiment.  Imagine a
counterfactual election which is just like the 2010 election except for the following feature. In
this election Labour received 7.1% more votes than the Conservatives UK-wide due to the
fact that, within each constituency, Labour received 7.1% more votes and the Conservatives
received 7.1% less votes than they actually did.  We now calculate how many seats Labour
and the Conservatives would have secured in this counterfactual election. As it turns out,
Labour would have secured 354 seats, which is not 7.4% more seats, but 23.2% more seats
—i.e. much more than 7.4%—than the Conservatives. 
We quantify this pro-Labour bias by taking the difference between the number of seats
Labour would have secured in the counterfactual election and the number of seats the
Conservatives actually secured. This difference is 354 – 306 = 48 seats.
So equally strong wins in terms of votes UK-wide by the Conservatives in the actual election and by Labour
in the counterfactual election yield substantially more seats for Labour in the counterfactual election than for
the Conservatives in the actual election. This is the pro-Labour electoral bias, exemplified in the 2010
election.  And this is what the Conservatives find objectionable.
Why is there this electoral bias? First, Labour tends to win in smaller constituencies.  Second, Labour tends
to win in constituencies with smaller voter turnout.  Any electoral bias that is not explained by these two
factors is due to various features of the distribution of votes between Labour, the Conservatives and other
parties, which we will lump together in a residual category.  Looking at the first two factors:
Labour tends to win in smaller constituencies. The average size of Labour constituencies is 68,487
whereas the average size of Conservative constituencies is 72,418. This is partly due to fact that
Labour performed much stronger than the Conservatives in Wales and Scotland where constituencies
tend to be smaller than in England. (The average size of constituencies in Wales is 56,628 and in
Scotland 65,475, whereas the average size in England is 71,858.) But even within England, the
average size of Labour constituencies is 70,252 as compared to the average size of Conservative
constituencies of 72,816.
Labour tends to win in constituencies with smaller voter turnout.  The average turnout in Labour
constituencies was 61.1% whereas the average turnout in Conservative constituencies was 68.3%.
There is little we can do about electoral bias due to differences in voter turnout and the distribution of votes.
And even if we could, it is not clear that we would want to do something about it.
Electoral bias on grounds of unequal constituency sizes is a different story. Suppose that Labour secures 2
seats for winning two constituencies with 35,000 people and the Conservatives secure 1 seat for winning a
single constituency with 70,000 people, always with narrow wins and say average voter turnouts. Then the
Conservatives do seem to have some ground for complaint and there does seem to be a reason for a
correction based on fairness considerations.
However, unequal constituency sizes and voting patterns are never this simple.  Equalising constituency
sizes is costly in many respects.  Before embarking on this route, we may want to have some kind of estimate
of how much of a correction it would bring to the electoral bias, since unequal constituency sizes is only one
factor that contributes to the electoral bias.
We could take a proposal that is on the table, fill in the details and calculate electoral outcomes and bias
starting from the 2010 elections. However, there are many problems in carrying out this exercise.  First, there
are many ways of redrawing the borders yielding very different results.  Second, if the plan is to enlarge
constituency A with, say, 20% of constituency B, then in order to calculate what the election results would
have been like in the enlarged constituency A, we need to make the unrealistic assumption that voting
patterns are homogeneous throughout constituency B.  This assumption is required unless we know what
part of B will go to A and what the distribution of votes is within this part—and this is information that is
typically not available.  Third, any realistic proposal makes only partial corrections for unequal constituency
sizes and so we would only learn about the impact of partially removing the factor of unequal constituency
size.  And finally, we should not forget that voters would of course have displayed different voting behaviour
if they had voted in constituencies that are differently delineated. For all these reasons we decided to follow
a different route.
We have tried to estimate the relative impact of equalising constituency sizes.  Imagine three shadow nations
that are just like the UK in that they have the same constituencies and that political parties receive precisely
the same proportions of votes within each constituency as they actually did in the 2010 elections.  However,
we implement the following changes.
1. Shadow nation 1 is just like the UK, except that each constituency has mean UK-wide constituency size
of the 2010 elections;
2. Shadow nation 2 is just like the UK, except that each constituency has mean UK-wide voter turnout of
the 2010 elections;
3. Shadow nation 3 is just like the UK, except that each constituency has mean constituency size and has
mean voter turnout.
We listed the electoral bias for each of these shadow nations:
Voter Turn Out within
Constituencies
Constituency Sizes Electoral Bias
UK Actual voter turn out Actual constituency sizes  48 100%
Shadow
Nation 1
Actual voter turnout Mean constituency sizes  38 79 %
Shadow
Nation 2
Mean voter turn out Actual constituency sizes  25 52%
Shadow
Nation 3
Mean voter turn out Mean constituency sizes  12  25%
In a shadow nation in which we neutralise the impact of unequal constituency sizes completely, we eliminate
21% of the electoral bias on voting patterns of the 2010 election.  Compare this to the fact that in a shadow
nation in which we neutralise the impact of unequal voter turnout, we eliminate 48% of the electoral bias. 
And in a shadow nation with both impacts neutralised we eliminate 75 % of the electoral bias—25% still
remains due to the residual effect of the distribution of votes.
Is the effect of equalising constituency sizes worth the risk of gerrymandering and breaking up natural,
historical and social boundaries?  A shadow nation in which the sizes of the constituencies are equalised
retains 79% of the original bias. Furthermore,even the 21% reduction of the electoral bias comes about only
in a shadow nation that fully neutralised unequal constituency sizes.  Any adjustment in the constituency
sizes will always remain partial—we will not reach full equality.  Hence, the expected reduction may even fall
short of this projected 21%.
Extrapolating from our exercise with the 2010 election, we project that equalising constituency sizes is likely
to reduce the electoral bias somewhat. However, it is by no means a magic bullet.  If other explanatory
factors remain constant in future elections, then most of the pro-Labour electoral bias will remain even after
substantial adjustments in constituency sizes.
(For similar conclusions see also Borisyuk, Johnston, Rallings and Thrasher (Parliamentary Affairs,  63,
2010, 4–21) and Thrasher, Borisyuk, Rallings and Johnston (Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties,
21, 2011, 279–94.)
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